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I. INTRODUCTION
This article surveys recent significant developments in Virginia
civil practice and procedure. Specifically, the article discusses
opinions of the Supreme Court of Virginia from June 2010
through June 2011 addressing civil procedure topics; significant
amendments to the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia con-
cerning procedural issues during the same period; and legislation
enacted by the Virginia General Assembly during its 2011 session
that relates to civil practice.
II. DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA
A. Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege
In Walton v. Mid-Atlantic Spine Specialists, P.C., the Supreme
Court of Virginia articulated a multi-part test for evaluating
whether the attorney-client privilege is waived by virtue of the
inadvertent disclosure of an otherwise privileged communication
during the course of discovery.! The Walton case involved a doctor
who inadvertently produced a letter written to his lawyer during
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1. 280 Va. 113, 126-27, 694 S.E.2d 545, 552 (2010).
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a document production in response to a subpoena duces tecum.2
According to the doctor, he kept the letter separate from the pa-
tient's medical records. Nevertheless, the copy service he used to
gather the subpoenaed documents "obtained a copy of the letter
and produced it" along with the patient's records.4
On appeal, the supreme court held "that the disclosure of the
letter was inadvertent."' Echoing the sentiments of most Virginia
litigators, the supreme court noted that such inadvertent produc-
tion "is a specter that haunts every document intensive case."'
According to the supreme court, inadvertent disclosure includes
the "failure to exercise proper precautions to safeguard the privi-
leged document, and does not require that the disclosure be a re-
sult of criminal activity or bad faith."' The supreme court held
that waiver may occur if reasonable measures were not taken to
''maintain the document's confidentiality" or to take prompt and
reasonable action to correct a mistaken production.! The court
then adopted the following multi-part test for considering wheth-
er this standard has been met in a particular case:
(1) the reasonableness of the precautions to prevent inadvertent dis-
closures, (2) the time taken to rectify the error, (3) the scope of the
discovery, (4) the extent of the disclosure, and (5) whether the party
asserting the claim of privilege or protection for the communication
has used its unavailability for misleading or otherwise improper or
overreaching purposes in the litigation, making it unfair to allow the
party to invoke confidentiality under the circumstances.9
"None of [the above] factors is ... dispositive, and the [reviewing]
court [should] also consider any other factors . . . that have . . .
bearing on the reasonableness issues.""o Evaluating the doctor's
inadvertent production of the document at issue, the supreme
court reversed the trial court's decision and held that the doctor
2. Id. at 118-19, 694 S.E.2d at 547.
3. See id. at 118, 694 S.E.2d at 547.
4. Id. at 118-19, 694 S.E.2d at 547.
5. Id. at 125, 694 S.E.2d at 551. The doctors had argued, and the circuit court had
ruled, that the privilege was not waived because the disclosure was "involuntary," as the
letter had not been disclosed by the doctor or his lawyer and the doctor had taken reason-
able precautions to avoid disclosure. Id. at 121, 124, 694 S.E.2d at 548, 550-51.
6. Id. at 126, 694 S.E.2d at 551 (quoting FDIC v. Marine Midland Realty Corp., 138
F.R.D. 479, 479-80 (E.D. Va. 1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 126-27, 694 S.E.2d at 552 (citing FDIC, 138 F.R.D. at 482).
9. Id. at 127, 694 S.E.2d at 552.
10. Id.
10 [Vol. 46:9
CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
had not met his burden to prove that privilege had not been
waived, as he had failed to establish the sufficiency of the
measures employed to safeguard the document, and exclusion of
the document raised a significant possibility that the doctor's own
testimony would mislead the jury."
B. Signing Pleadings
On the same day, the Supreme Court of Virginia issued two
opinions striking down efforts of a pro se litigant and a Virginia
lawyer to have individuals who were not licensed to practice law
in Virginia sign pleadings on their behalf. 12 In Aguilera v. Chris-
tian, a pro se plaintiff authorized a neighbor, who was a lawyer
licensed to practice in Washington, D.C., but not Virginia, to sign
the plaintiffs name for him on his complaint.'" The neighbor
"signed [the plaintiffs] name . . . [, but] placed her initials . . . di-
rectly above the signature." 4 The trial court dismissed the com-
plaint because it was not signed by the plaintiff himself or by a
Virginia attorney, as required by Virginia Code section 8.01-
271.1, and therefore a nullity." On appeal, the pro se plaintiff
contended that as long as the signature was placed on the com-
plaint with his permission and the intent to authenticate it, then
the statutory requirement was satisfied." The supreme court dis-
agreed, holding that section 8.01-271.1 states unambiguously
that "a party not represented by an attorney 'shall sign' a plead-
ing."" Therefore, because the complaint had not been signed by
the pro se plaintiff himself, or by a Virginia attorney on his be-
half, it was a nullity and properly dismissed."8
In Shipe v. Hunter, the supreme court decided the "closely re-
lated question [of] whether a Virginia [attorney] may . .. author-
ize [an out-of-state attorney] to sign the Virginia [attorney's]
name to a pleading."" In Shipe, a Virginia attorney representing
11. Id. at 130-31, 694 S.E.2d at 554.
12. See Aguilera v. Christian, 280 Va. 486, 488-89, 699 S.E.2d 517, 518-19 (2010);
Shipe v. Hunter, 280 Va. 480, 482-83, 485, 699 S.E.2d 519, 520, 522 (2010).
13. Aguilera, 280 Va. at 487 & n.1, 699 S.E.2d at 518 & n.1.
14. Id. at 487, 699 S.E.2d at 518.
15. Id. at 488, 699 S.E.2d at 518.
16. Id. at 488-89, 699 S.E.2d at 518-19.
17. Id. at 489, 699 S.E.2d at 519.
18. Id.
19. 280 Va. 480, 482, 699 S.E.2d 519, 519-20 (2010).
2011] 11
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
the plaintiff in a civil lawsuit, along with foreign co-counsel, au-
thorized his co-counsel to sign the Virginia attorney's name on
the complaint.20 The co-counsel did so by signing the Virginia at-
torney's name to the pleading followed by his initials.2 1 As in
Aguilera, the trial court in Shipe found that the complaint was a
nullity due to the deficient signature and dismissed it.22 In decid-
ing the issue, the supreme court again cited to section 8.01-271.1,
but also to Rule 1A:4 of the Supreme Court of Virginia, which
provides that no out-of-state lawyer may appear pro hac vice ex-
cept in association with local counsel who is an active member in
good standing with the Virginia State Bar, and that any pleading
is invalid unless signed by local counsel.2 3 Similar to the plaintiff
in Aguilera, the plaintiff in Shipe contended that "a person may
make another his agent for the purpose of signing a pleading and
... ,if the [signature is] authorized . .. [, it is] as effective as if
the [individual] had personally signed."24 In rejecting this proposi-
tion, the court stressed the policy reasons behind the requirement
that a party, or a Virginia attorney on the party's behalf, sign
25pleadings that are filed in Virginia courts.
C. Relief from Default
In AME Financial Corporation v. Kiritsis, the Supreme Court
of Virginia evaluated whether a trial court abused its discretion
in failing to grant leave to file a late responsive pleading to a par-
ty found to be in default.26 Counsel for the plaintiff in the case had
notified a vice president of defendant A1VIE Financial Corporation
("AME") that the company would need to retain a Virginia attor-
ney to file responsive pleadings to his client's complaint.27 Never-
theless, AlVIE filed an answer signed only by the vice president,
who was not an attorney.2 8 The plaintiff filed a motion to strike
20. See id. at 482-83, 699 S.E.2d at 520.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 483, 699 S.E.2d at 520 (citing VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 1A, R. 1A:4 (Repl. Vol.
2010)).
24. Id., 699 S.E.2d at 521.
25. Id. at 484, 699 S.E.2d at 521. The court also held that the defect could not be
cured by amendment. Id. at 485, 699 S.E.2d at 521-22 (citing Kone v. Wilson, 272 Va. 59,
63, 630 S.E.2d 744, 746 (2006)).
26. 281 Va. 384, 386, 707 S.E.2d 820, 821-22 (2011).
27. Id. at 388, 707 S.E.2d at 821.
28. Id. at 387-88, 707 S.E.2d at 821.
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the answer, based on the defective signature, and for default
judgment.29 AME did not appear for a hearing on the motions, de-
spite having been sent notice, and the trial court granted the
plaintiffs motion to strike and found A1VIE in default." Ten days
after the hearing, and more than two months after being told of
the need to secure representation, AME hired Virginia counsel,
who filed a motion for leave to file late responsive pleadings and,
subsequently, a motion for relief from default, which were both
denied."
On appeal, AIVIE contended that the trial court abused its dis-
cretion in denying its motions because it had demonstrated good
cause." Rule 3:19 of the Supreme Court of Virginia provides that,
"[p]rior to the entry of judgment, for good cause shown the court
may grant leave to a defendant who is in default to file a late re-
sponsive pleading."3 3 Although noting that it had not yet had oc-
casion to construe the term "good cause" as used in the current
Rule 3:19, the supreme court explained that it had previously
held that circumstances supporting the extension of time to file a
late pleading include but are not limited to
lack of prejudice to the opposing party, the good faith of the moving
party, the promptness of the moving party in responding to the op-
posing parties' decision to progress with the cause, the existence of a
meritorious claim or substantial defense, the existence of legitimate
extenuating circumstances, and [the] justified belief that the suit has
34been abandoned.
Regardless, the court made clear that "[a] good cause determina-
tion invests a trial court with discretion," and also noted that,
even if good cause is shown, the trial court still has discretion to
grant or refuse a late filing under the language of Rule 3:19.3' Fo-
cusing on AME's pre-filing notice that it needed Virginia counsel,
as well as AME's failure to appear for the default hearing, the
supreme court held that the trial court did not abuse its discre-
tion in refusing to allow a late-filed responsive pleading."
29. Id. at 388, 391, 707 S.E.2d at 821, 823.
30. Id. at 388, 707 S.E.2d at 822.
31. Id. at 387-89, 707 S.E.2d at 821-22.
32. Id. at 391, 707 S.E.2d at 823.
33. VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 3, R. 3.19(b) (Repl. Vol. 2011).
34. Kiritsis, 281 Va. at 392, 707 S.E.2d at 824.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 391-94, 707 S.E.2d at 823-25.
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D. Statutes of Limitation
The Supreme Court of Virginia issued several recent opinions
addressing statutes of limitation, including accrual of claims and
tolling." In Van Dam v. Gay, the supreme court answered the
question of when a right of action for legal malpractice accrued,
thereby triggering the running of the statute of limitations." The
attorney represented the wife in a divorce case and drafted a
property settlement agreement that was incorporated into the fi-
nal decree of divorce, entered in 1986.'9 When the husband died in
2006, the wife applied for survivor's benefits under certain federal
retirement plans in which the husband participated, but her
claims were rejected on the grounds that the settlement agree-
ment was, as a matter of federal law, insufficient to entitle her to
benefits under the plans.4 0 In response to the wife's legal malprac-
tice suit, the attorney who drafted the agreement pled the statute
of limitations, and the issue presented to the supreme court was
the date of accrual of the wife's right of action.4 1 While conceding
that her discovery of the malpractice did not trigger accrual of the
right of action under Virginia Code section 8.01-230, the wife con-
tended that, because injury or damage is an essential element of
a malpractice claim, her cause of action could not have accrued
until the death of the husband, as "her right to survivors' benefits
[under his retirement plans was] contingent upon his predeceas-
ing her."4 2 The supreme court rejected this argument, ruling that
the wife suffered a legal injury with regard to her rights to the re-
tirement plans in 1986, by virtue of the entry of the final decree
incorporating the deficient settlement agreement.4 In so ruling,
the supreme court noted:
Some injury or damage, however slight, is essential to a cause of ac-
tion, but it is immaterial that all the damages resulting from the
37. See Chalifoux v. Radiology Assocs. of Richmond, Inc., 281 Va. 690, 708 S.E.2d 834
(2011); Addison v. Jurgelsky, 281 Va. 205, 704 S.E.2d 402 (2011); Estate of Conger v. Bar-
rett, 280 Va. 627, 702 S.E.2d 117 (2010); Van Dam v. Gay, 280 Va. 457, 699 S.E.2d 480
(2010).
38. 280 Va. at 459, 699 S.E.2d at 480.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 459-60, 699 S.E.2d at 480-81.
42. Id. at 461, 699 S.E.2d at 481.
43. Id. at 462, 699 S.E.2d at 482.
14 [Vol. 46:9
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injury do not occur at the time of the injury. The running of the limi-
tation period will not be tolled by the fact that actual or substantial
44damages did not occur until a later date.
In Estate of Conger v. Barrett, the supreme court addressed the
interplay between Virginia Code section 8.01-244(B), addressing
the tolling of the statute of limitations governing wrongful death
claims, and Virginia Code section 8.01-335(B), addressing the dis-
continuance of cases inactive for over three years. 45 The Conger
case involved a wrongful death claim brought in 2002, which was
subsequently dismissed in 2007 under section 8.01-335(B) due to
inactivity for over three years." As allowed under section 8.01-
335, the plaintiff filed a motion within one year of the dismissal
to reinstate the case, and the trial court granted the motion.47 The
defendant subsequently filed a plea of the statute of limitations,
arguing the discontinuance order "dismissed the case 'without de-
termining the merits of [the] action' within the meaning of Code §
8.01-244(B)," and contending that the two-year limitations period
had run during the period between the discontinuance order and
the motion to reinstate. In ruling on the issue, the supreme
court noted that Virginia Code sections 8.01-244(B) and 8.01-
335(B) "are both implicated but they are not in conflict."49 The su-
44. Id. at 463, 699 S.E.2d at 482-83.
45. 280 Va. 627, 631-32, 702 S.E.2d 117, 118-19 (2010).
46. Id. at 629-30, 702 S.E.2d at 117-18. Virginia Code section 8.01-335(B) provides as
follows:
Any court in which is pending a case wherein for more than three years there
has been no order or proceeding, except to continue it, may, in its discretion,
order it to be struck from its docket and the action shall thereby be discon-
tinued. The court may dismiss cases under this subsection without any notice
to the parties. The clerk shall provide the parties with a copy of the final or-
der discontinuing or dismissing the case. Any case discontinued or dismissed
under the provisions of this subsection may be reinstated, on motion, after
notice to the parties in interest, if known, or their counsel of record within
one year from the date of such order but not after.
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-335(B) (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2011). According to the su-
preme court, the reinstatement provision in section 8.01-335(B) "creates a rare exception
to the rule that a circuit court loses jurisdiction over a case [twenty-one] days after enter-
ing a final order." Conger, 280 Va. at 631-32, 702 S.E.2d at 119.
47. Conger, 280 Va. at 630, 702 S.E.2d at 118.
48. Id. Virginia Code section 8.01-244(B) states that if any wrongful death action
is brought within [a] period of two years after such person's death and for any
cause abates or is dismissed without determining the merits of such action,
the time such action is pending shall not be counted as any part of such peri-
od of two years and another action may be brought within the remaining pe-
riod of such two years as if such former action had not been instituted.
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-244(B) (Cum. Supp. 2011) (alteration in original).
49. Conger, 280 Va. at 631, 702 S.E.2d at 118.
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preme court held that, "by its plain terms, Code § 8.01-244(B)
bars only the filing of another action if the two-year limitation pe-
riod has expired," and that a "motion [under section 8.01-335] to
reinstate [a] case [does] not create another action."' The supreme
court therefore reversed the trial court's order dismissing the case
under section 8.01-244(B)."
The supreme court also addressed the statute of limitations
under section 8.01-244 in Addison v. Jurgelsky.5 In that case, a
wrongful death claim was brought by only one of two co-
administrators of the decedent's estate. 53 The defendants raised
the issue of nonjoinder and the court granted leave to file an
amended complaint adding the co-administrator as an additional
plaintiff.54 Thereafter, defendants filed a plea in bar, arguing that
the two-year statute of limitations under section 8.01-244 was not
tolled by the filing of the initial complaint "because an action by
only one of two co-administrators was a nullity," and the trial
court dismissed the amended complaint.5' On appeal, the supreme
court first addressed the issue of whether a single co-
administrator may file an action under Virginia's wrongful death
statutes." In analyzing this question, the court looked to the plain
meaning of the language of section 8.01-50(B), which states that
"[e]very such action under this section shall be brought by and in
the name of the personal representative of such deceased person
within the time limits specified in § 8.01-244."'' The court ruled
that in using the term "personal representative" in section 8.01-
50, the General Assembly "intended a unity of action whether
there is one personal representative or more than one."" The
court then addressed the issue of whether the absent co-
administrator could be joined as a plaintiff after the expiration of
the statute of limitations. 9 On this point, the court looked to sec-
tion 8.01-5(A), which states in relevant part that "[n]o action or
suit shall abate or be defeated by the nonjoinder or misjoinder of
50. Id. at 633, 702 S.E.2d at 119-20 (internal quotation marks omitted).
51. Id. at 633-34, 702 S.E.2d at 120.
52. 281 Va. 205, 207-08, 704 S.E.2d 402, 404 (2011).
53. Id., 704 S.E.2d at 403-04.
54. Id. at 207, 704 S.E.2d at 403-04.
55. Id. at 207-08, 704 S.E.2d at 404.
56. Id. at 208-09, 704 S.E.2d at 404-05.
57. Id. (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-50(B) (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2011)).
58. Id. at 208, 704 S.E.2d at 404.
59. See id. at 210-11, 704 S.E.2d at 405-06.
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parties,. .. but. . . new parties may be added ... by order of the
court at any time as the ends of justice may require."" After re-
viewing the public policy behind the statute of limitations, the
court held that "§ 8.01-5 permits the joinder of a co-administrator
to a wrongful death action under Code § 8.01-50 when the other
co-administrator is already a party plaintiff and the claims in the
suit do not change as a result of the joinder."" The court further
held that the single co-administrator's initial filing tolled the lim-
itations period under section 8.01-244, and therefore reversed the
trial court's dismissal of the case.
In Chalifoux v. Radiology Associates of Richmond, Inc., the Su-
preme Court of Virginia considered whether to apply the "contin-
uing treatment rule" to a medical malpractice claim against a ra-
diology group that had conducted a series of magnetic resonance
imagings on the plaintiff patient in connection with her treat-
ment by certain other physicians." The suit was brought more
than two years from the date of the alleged malpractice, but the
plaintiff contended that, based on her continuing treatment by
the radiology group, the statute of limitations did not begin to run
until the conclusion of the course of treatment.6 4 The trial court
held that the plaintiffs treatments by the radiology group "were
'single, isolated acts [that did] not toll the statute of limitations'
and dismissed the case." On appeal, the supreme court reviewed
the history of its continuing treatment rule jurisprudence in the
health care area and noted that the "dispositive issue is whether
'a continuous and substantially uninterrupted course of examina-
tion and treatment' existed between [plaintiff] and [the radiology
group], or whether [the group's] treatment of [plaintiff] was a se-
ries of 'single, isolated act[s].""' Noting that it had not previously
considered the application of the continuing treatment rule to ra-
diologists, the court reviewed cases from other jurisdictions ad-
60. Id. at 210, 704 S.E.2d at 405 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-5(A) (Repl. Vol. 2007
& Cum. Supp. 2011)).
61. Id. at 210-11, 704 S.E.2d at 405-06.
62. Id. at 211, 704 S.E.2d at 406.
63. 281 Va. 690, 692-94, 699-701, 708 S.E.2d 834, 835-36, 839-40 (2011).
64. See id. at 694, 708 S.E.2d at 836.
65. Id. at 695, 708 S.E.2d at 837 (quoting Chalifoux v. Radiology Assocs. of Richmond,
Inc., 79 Va. Cir. 356, 356 (2009) (Richmond City)).
66. Id. at 96-98, 708 S.E.2d at 837-38 (quoting Farley v. Goode, 219 Va. 969, 976,
980, 252 S.E.2d 594, 599, 601 (1979)) (alteration in original).
2011] 17
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
dressing the rule in the radiology context." Emphasizing that the
plaintiffs treating physicians referred her to the radiology group
on six occasions during roughly a three-year period for studies re-
lated to the same or similar symptoms, the court held that 'a
continuous and . .. uninterrupted course of . .. treatment' existed
between [plaintiff] and [the radiology group] .,,6 Thus, the contin-
uous treatment rule applied and the statute of limitations did not
begin to run until the physician-patient relationship between the
group and plaintiff ended."
E. Variance Between Pleading and Evidence
In several recent cases, the Supreme Court of Virginia evaluat-
ed issues of variance between pleadings and the evidence at trial
and motions to amend the pleadings to conform to the evidence.o
Syed v. ZH Technologies, Inc., a business torts case, involved,
among other things, claims of breach of fiduciary duty, conspira-
cy, and tortious interference." At trial, the plaintiff company pre-
sented evidence suggesting that one of the defendants had
breached his fiduciary duty as a partner, whereas the complaint
had alleged a breach in his capacity as an employee, and that the
same defendant had engaged in a conspiracy with an individual
not referenced in the complaint." At the conclusion of the evi-
dence, the plaintiff moved to amend its pleadings to conform to
this evidence, but the motion was denied by the trial court, which
ruled that it would be "fundamentally unfair" at that point to al-
low the amendment after the defendants had put on their case in
response to the allegations as pled." The trial court did, however,
"allow[] [the plaintiff] to argue to the jury, based upon instruc-
tions that conformed to the evidence," and the jury returned a
verdict in favor of the plaintiff on the breach of fiduciary duty and
67. See id. at 699-700, 708 S.E.2d at 839.
68. Id. at 700-01, 708 S.E.2d at 839-40 (quoting Farley, 219 Va. at 976, 252 S.E.2d at
599).
69. Id. at 701, 708 S.E.2d at 840.
70. See Dabney v. Augusta Mut. Ins. Co., 282 Va. 78, 710 S.E.2d 726 (2011); Bennett
v. Sage Payment Solutions, Inc., 282 Va. 49, 710 S.E.2d 736 (2011); Syed v. ZH Techs.,
Inc., 280 Va. 58, 694 S.E.2d 625 (2010).
71. 280 Va. at 61, 694 S.E.2d at 627.
72. Id. at 62-64, 694 S.E.2d at 627-29.
73. Id. at 64-65, 694 S.E.2d at 629.
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conspiracy claims." In assessing the trial court's decision, the su-
preme court cited Virginia Code section 8.01-377, which provides
as follows:
If, at the trial of any action, there appears to be a variance between
the evidence and the allegations or recitals, the court, if it consider [s]
that substantial justice will be promoted and that the opposite party
cannot be prejudiced thereby, may allow the pleadings to be amend-
ed, on such terms as to the payment of costs or postponement of the
trial, or both, as it may deem reasonable. Or, instead of the plead-
ings being amended, the court may direct the jury to find the facts,
and, after such finding, if it consider the variance such as could not
have prejudiced the opposite party, shall give judgment according to
the right of the case.
The supreme court then held that it was fundamentally unfair
for the trial court to allow jury instructions and argument on an
unpled theory of breach of fiduciary duty by a partner when the
defendant had not had an opportunity to defend against such a
claim and was prejudiced against as a result." As to the business
conspiracy claim, the court did not address the variance issue, be-
cause reversal was necessary due to the trial court's error in hav-
ing allowed a retrial on damages when the jury had awarded "$0"
in compensatory damages for the claim.77 The court held that be-
cause the jury found no damages, an essential element of the
claim, it was an error for the trial court to have confirmed the
verdict as to liability." The court also held that the trial court had
erred in allowing a new trial on damages for the tortious interfer-
ence claim when the jury had awarded punitive damages, while
finding "$0" in compensatory damages."
In Dabney v. Augusta Mutual Insurance Co., an insurance cov-
erage case, the supreme court considered whether a trial court
erred in barring a jury from considering facts not pled in the
complaint." The plaintiffs complaint stated that she provided the
defendant insurance company with timely notice of her claim in
May 2004, but at trial she put on evidence showing that the in-
74. Id. at 65-66, 694 S.E.2d at 629.
75. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-377 (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2011); Syed, 280 Va. at
70-71, 694 S.E.2d at 632.
76. Syed, 280 Va. at 71, 694 S.E.2d at 632-33.
77. Id. at 72-73, 694 S.E.2d at 633.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 74-75, 694 S.E.2d at 634.
80. 282 Va. 78, 81, 710 S.E.2d 726, 728 (2011).
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surer received notice regarding her claim in early 2005.8' At the
conclusion of the evidence, the insurance company moved to
strike, contending that the plaintiffs complaint only alleged no-
tice in May 2004 and thus "the issue submitted to the jury should
be limited to whether [the company] had notice of [the] claim [at
that time]."" The trial court agreed, "rul[ing] that [the plaintiff]
was bound by the allegations in her ... complaint."" On appeal,
the supreme court noted that "[t]he law in Virginia is well-
established that a court cannot enter judgment based on facts
that are not alleged in the parties' pleadings," and therefore up-
held the trial court's decision to limit the plaintiffs relief based
upon the allegations in her complaint.8 4
In Bennett v. Sage Payment Solutions, Inc., a breach of contract
case, the supreme court upheld an amendment to conform to the
evidence under Virginia Code section 8.01-377." In the instant
case, the plaintiffs own testimony tended to show that he had re-
pudiated the parties' agreement." As a result, "prior to the close
of [the plaintiffs] case-in-chief, [the defendant] moved . .. to
amend its [answer under section 8.01-377] to [assert] a defense of
repudiation," which the trial court allowed. 7 In considering the
propriety of the trial court's decision, the supreme court held that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the
amendment because the plaintiffs own evidence established the
defense, thereby negating the plaintiffs argument that he was
prejudiced by the amendment.8
F. Expert Testimony
The Supreme Court of Virginia held in CNH America L.L. C. v.
Smith that a trial court abused its discretion by admitting the
81. Id. at 84, 710 S.E.2d at 729.
82. Id. at 83-84, 710 S.E.2d at 729.
83. Id., 710 S.E.2d at 729-30.
84. Id. at 86-87, 710 S.E.2d at 730-31. The Supreme Court of Virginia noted that
"[the plaintiffs] counsel did not argue to the [trial] court that ... [her] pleading could [be]
amended to conform to the evidence [under section 8.01-377]." Id. at 87 n.3, 710 S.E.2d at
731 n.3.
85. 282 Va. 49, 59-61, 710 S.E.2d 736, 742-43 (2011).
86. Id. at 59-61, 710 S.E.2d at 742-43.
87. Id. at 53-55, 710 S.E.2d at 739-40.
88. Id. at 61, 710 S.E.2d at 743.
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testimony of two experts in a product liability case." The plaintiff
was injured when a hose on a hay mower burst, injecting burning
hydraulic fluid into his hand.90 In support of his claims against
the manufacturer of the mower, the plaintiff presented testimony
from two experts." The first expert, who testified that the hose
had a manufacturing defect, admittedly had never qualified as a
hose expert." The expert also admitted that he performed no tests
to support his defect theory and that he saw no evidence of the
defect when he inspected the hose." The second expert, called to
testify about the mower's hydraulic system, "admitted that his
experience [in] hydraulic[s] . . . was [confined] to the mining in-
dustry and that he was not an expert in the . . . type . . . of ...
mower [at issue]." The trial court allowed testimony from both
experts over the defendant's objection and the jury returned a
verdict in favor of the plaintiff.9 4 On appeal, the supreme court
stated that "expert testimony is inadmissible if it rests on as-
sumptions that have an insufficient factual basis or it fails to take
into account all of the relevant variables."" As to the first expert,
the supreme court ruled that the trial court abused its discretion
in allowing the testimony because it was not based upon an ade-
quate foundation, as the expert had admitted that he failed to
perform tests he could have performed to support his defect theo-
ry." The court ruled that it was also an abuse of discretion to al-
low the second expert because his qualifications did not correlate
to the opinions he gave at trial."
In Condominium Services, Inc. v. First Owners' Ass'n of Forty
Six Hundred Condominium, Inc., a case involving claims of
breach of a property management agreement and conversion of
funds, the supreme court addressed whether a trial court abused
its discretion in allowing an expert's testimony in light of the par-
ty's expert designation-an issue recently imprinted on the minds
89. 281 Va. 60, 62-63, 67-68, 704 S.E.2d 372, 373, 375-76 (2011).
90. Id. at 62-64, 704 S.E.2d at 373-74.
91. Id. at 62-65, 704 S.E.2d at 373-74.
92. Id. at 64, 704 S.E.2d at 374.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 67, 704 S.E.2d at 375 (citing Tittsworth v. Robinson, 252 Va. 151, 154, 475
S.E.2d 261, 263 (1996); Tarmac Mid-Atl., Inc. v. Smiley Block Co., 250 Va. 161, 166, 458
S.E.2d 462, 465-66 (1995)).
96. Id. at 67-68, 704 S.E.2d at 375-76.
97. See id. at 68, 704 S.E.2d at 376.
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of all Virginia trial lawyers by the case of John Crane, Inc. v.
Jones." In response to a standard expert disclosure interrogatory,
the owners' association identified an accountant and stated that
he would opine that the opposing party's failures caused the asso-
ciation to underpay taxes and incur interest and penalties as a
result." The interrogatory answer did not state the amount of the
interest or penalty the expert believed the owners' association
would incur, but the expert later testified to the figures in his
deposition."oo A motion in limine was later filed seeking to exclude
the expert from testifying about potential penalties and interest
because the expert interrogatory answer "failed to [state] the
amount of . .. penalties and interest claimed and failed to state
the basis for . . . such damages.""0 ' The trial court denied the mo-
tion and allowed the testimony. 102 On appeal, the supreme court
noted that a trial court's decision to admit or exclude expert tes-
timony is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard.' In
evaluating the trial court's decision to allow the testimony, the
court stated that, although the association "did not itemize the
specific amounts of penalties and interest, the interrogatory re-
sponse disclosed that it was [the expert's] opinion that [the oppos-
ing party's] failures resulted in underpayment of taxes and [the
association] incurring interest and penalties."104 The supreme
court therefore held that it was within the trial court's discretion
to determine that the response sufficiently disclosed the subject
matter of the expert's testimony, the substance of the opinions,
and the grounds for such opinions.'0 ' In so holding, the supreme
court contrasted the John Crane case, where the opinions at issue
had not been disclosed in any form.'0 6
98. Condominium Servs., Inc., 281 Va. 561, 567, 575-76, 709 S.E.2d 163, 167, 172
(2011). In John Crane, the supreme court upheld a trial court's decision to exclude expert
testimony that was not included in the party's expert interrogatory response, even though
the opposing party was aware of the opinions from deposition and testimony in other pro-
ceedings. See 274 Va. 581, 586, 591-92, 650 S.E.2d 851, 856 (2007).
99. Condominium Serus., Inc., 281 Va. at 567, 569, 709 S.E.2d at 167-68.
100. Id. at 569-70, 709 S.E.2d at 168.
101. Id. at 570, 709 S.E.2d at 168.
102. See id.
103. Id. at 575, 709 S.E.2d at 172 (citing John Crane, 274 Va. at 591, 650 S.E.2d at
856); Blue Ridge Serv. Corp. v. Saxon Shoes, Inc., 271 Va. 206, 212, 624 S.E.2d 55, 58
(2006)).
104. Id. at 576, 709 S.E.2d at 172.
105. Id.
106. Compare Condominium Servs., Inc., 281 Va. at 576, 709 S.E.2d at 172, with John
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G. Evidence
In Jones v. Williams, the Supreme Court of Virginia construed
the corroboration requirements of Virginia's "Dead Man's Stat-
ute," Virginia Code section 8.01-397.07 Jones involved a personal
injury case against the personal representative of a deceased
physician who delivered a baby who suffered injuries during
birth.o' According to the testimony of the obstetric nurse, the
physician ordered her to apply "fundal pressure" to the mother in
an effort to address an emergency condition in the baby that had
developed during the course of the delivery.'o Section 8.01-397
provides as follows:
In an action by or against a person who, from any cause, is incapable
of testifying, or by or against the committee, trustee, executor, ad-
ministrator, heir, or other representative of the person so incapable
of testifying, no judgment or decree shall be rendered in favor of an
adverse or interested party founded on his uncorroborated testimo-
110
ny.
At trial, the defendant moved to strike the evidence, arguing
that the testimony regarding fundal pressure was inadmissible
under the Dead Man's Statute because the nurse was an interest-
ed party under the law who could not corroborate the claim."' The
trial court denied the motion and the jury returned a verdict in
favor of the plaintiff."2 The deceased physician's estate argued
that the nurse was an "interested party" for purposes of section
8.01-397 "because [the plaintiffs] recovery against [the physician]
relieved [the nurse] of potential liability.""' The supreme court,
however, disagreed, noting that "a witness whose testimony pro-
vides [grounds] for . .. her own liability is not an 'interested par-
ty,"' and that the nurse's testimony could have provided a basis
for a contribution claim against her by the physician's estate.114
The court also noted that the nurse's testimony was neutral on
Crane, 274 Va. at 592-93, 650 S.E.2d at 857.
107. 280 Va. 635, 637, 701 S.E.2d 405, 405 (2010); see also, e.g., Diehl v. Butts, 255 Va.
482, 487-89, 499 S.E.2d 833, 837-38 (1998) (discussing Virginia's "Dead Man's Statute").
108. Jones, 280 Va. at 637-38, 701 S.E.2d at 406.
109. Id. at 637, 701 S.E.2d at 406.
110. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-397 (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2011).
111. Jones, 280 Va. at 638, 701 S.E.2d at 406.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 639, 701 S.E.2d at 407.
114. Id. at 639-40, 701 S.E.2d at 407 (citing Johnson v. Raviotta, 264 Va. 27, 38 n.2,
563 S.E.2d 727, 734 n.2 (2002)).
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the dispositive question of when the fundal pressure was ap-
plied." The supreme court therefore upheld the trial court's deci-
sion to deny the motion to strike."6
At issue in Smith v. Commonwealth, a sexually violent preda-
tor commitment case, was whether the trial court erred in consid-
ering records of the respondent's treatment in a behavioral reha-
bilitation facility."' The subject objected to the consideration of
the records on the grounds that they were inadmissible hearsay
documents."' In evaluating the trial court's decision to consider
the treatment records, the supreme court held that the treatment
records "easily passed" the tests under Virginia law for meeting
the business records exception to the hearsay rule, noting that
department policy required creation of the records and that the
records were "maintained in the 'regular and ordinary course of
business for all residents' of the facility.11
In Midkiff v. Commonwealth, a criminal case involving child
pornography, the supreme court addressed a "best evidence rule"
issue regarding digital images, which is also instructive for civil
litigators in the electronic age.'2 0 In Midkiff, the trial court admit-
ted digital video recordings and still images of child pornography
reproduced from electronic files on DVDs copied from the hard
drives of the defendant's computer.12 At trial, the defendant ar-
gued that admission of the images and recordings violated the
best evidence rule because "they were a 'third generation re-
moved' from the defendant's hard drives."'"' In declining to extend
the best evidence rule to the images and recordings at issue, the
supreme court held that the rule is "limited to written docu-
ments."12 ' Furthermore, the court held that, given the testimony
of the Commonwealth's forensic expert, "the purpose of the rule,
reliability of evidence, is amply met," concluding that "the printed
115. Id. at 640, 701 S.E.2d at 407.
116. Id.
117. 280 Va. 178, 181, 694 S.E.2d 578, 579 (2010).
118. Id. at 181, 183, 694 S.E.2d at 579-80.
119. Id. at 183-84, 694 S.E.2d at 580-81.
120. 280 Va. 216, 217-19, 694 S.E.2d 576, 576-77 (2010).
121. Id. at 218-19, 694 S.E.2d at 577.
122. Id., 694 S.E.2d at 577.
123. Id. at 219, 694 S.E.2d at 577 (citing Meade v. Commonwealth, 177 Va. 811, 815,
12 S.E.2d 796, 797-98 (1941)).
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pictures and video recordings were reliable representations of the
material contained" in the files on the defendant's computer.
H. Res Judicata
In Gunter v. Martin, the supreme court addressed the doctrine
of res judicata as it existed prior to the enactment of Rule 1:6 in
July 2006.125 Gunter involved a suit by an alleged heir to a dece-
dent's estate against the decedent's widow to quiet title to certain
parcels of land and for their sale or allotment between the heir
and the widow. 2 6 Several years prior, in 2005, the same heir had
filed a different suit against the widow, individually and in her
capacity as administrator of the decedent's estate, contending
that the list of heirs filed by the administrator was incorrect (the
"2005 Suit")."7 The court dismissed the 2005 Suit because the
heir had not satisfied certain statutory requirements for filing an
affidavit of parenthood.128 The widow filed a plea in bar of res ju-
dicata in response to the heir's second suit, contending that the
claim was "dependent upon a determination that [the heir] is the
biological child of [the decedent]," which was decided in the 2005
Suit.129 The heir responded that the new claim was not barred by
res judicata, inter alia, because he sought different relief in the
second suit.30 The trial court sustained the plea in bar and dis-
missed the case."' On appeal, the supreme court stated that,
to prevail upon a plea of res judicata [outside of Rule 1:6], [the heir]
was required to establish four elements: identity of the remedies
sought, identity of the cause of action, identity of the parties, and
identity of the quality of the persons for or against whom the claim is
made.
124. Id. 218-20, 694 S.E.2d at 577-78.
125. 281 Va. 642, 643, 708 S.E.2d 875, 875 (2011). Rule 1:6 codified the doctrine of res
judicata and applies to all judgments entered in civil actions commenced after July 1,
2006. VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 1, R. 1:6 (Repl. Vol. 2011). The judgment at issue in Gunter was
not subject to Rule 1:6 because the action had been commenced in 2005. 281 Va. at 645,
708 S.E.2d at 876.
126. 281 Va. at 644, 708 S.E.2d at 876.
127. Id. at 643-44, 708 S.E.2d at 875-76.
128. Id. at 644, 708 S.E.2d at 876.
129. Id. at 645, 708 S.E.2d at 876.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id., 708 S.E.2d at 876-77 (quoting State Water Control Bd. v. Smithfield Foods,
Inc., 261 Va. 209, 214, 542 S.E.2d 766, 769 (2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Holding that the remedy sought was not of the same identity as
that sought in the 2005 Suit, the supreme court ruled that res ju-
dicata did not bar the claim and reversed the trial court's deci-
sion. 13
I. Jury Instructions and Law of the Case
The case of Wintergreen Partners, Inc. v. McGuireWoods, LLP,
involved a claim for legal malpractice over the failure to ensure
that trial transcripts were timely filed in connection with the ap-
peal of an adverse trial verdict.' In affirming the trial court's
grant of summary judgment for the defendant law firm in the
malpractice case, on the basis that the client could not prove as a
matter of law that the judgment would have been reversed if a
timely appeal had been filed, the supreme court once again made
clear that "[jury] instructions given without objection become the
law of the case and thereby bind the parties in the trial court and
... on review."' 3' Because the defendant in the underlying case for
the malpractice action failed to object to the verdict form and cer-
tain specific jury instructions offered, they became the law of the
case and supported the judgment."6 As a result, that same party
was unable to prove in its malpractice case that the trial verdict
would have been reversed on appeal if the transcripts had been
timely filed.'37 Thus, Virginia trial lawyers should be mindful of
the importance of raising specific objections to jury instructions.
J. Twenty-One Day Rule and Sanctions
The case of Johnson v. Woodard provided the Supreme Court of
Virginia an opportunity to address issues of retention of jurisdic-
tion under Rule 1:1, as well as the scope of sanctions under Vir-
ginia Code section 8.01-271.1.118 The case arose out of a petition
filed by forty citizens of Gloucester County who sought removal of
certain members of the Gloucester County's Board of Supervisors
133. Id. at 645-46, 708 S.E.2d at 877.
134. 280 Va. 374, 376, 698 S.E.2d 913, 914 (2010).
135. Id. at 376, 379-80, 698 S.E.2d at 914, 916 (quoting Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Thomas
Baker Real Estate, Ltd., 237 Va. 649, 652, 379 S.E.2d 344, 346 (1989)) (citations omitted).
136. Id. at 379-80, 698 S.E.2d at 916.
137. Id. at 376, 380, 698 S.E.2d at 914, 916 (citations omitted).
138. 281 Va. 403, 406, 707 S.E.2d 325, 326 (2011).
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for neglect of duty, misuse of office, or incompetence.' Following
the filing of the petition, "[t]he circuit court appointed a special
prosecutor to litigate the removal action."'o Later, the prosecutor
moved to nonsuit the removal action on technical grounds, but al-
so noted that "[b]ased on the information he had from witnesses,"
he did not believe the case would withstand a motion to strike."'
The trial court granted the motion for nonsuit and entered an or-
der stating in part that "for purposes of Rule 1:1, this is not a fi-
nal order, in that this [c]ourt shall retain jurisdiction of this mat-
ter to consider any application for attorney's fees and costs and
such other relief as may be sought."142 Subsequently, the supervi-
sors filed a motion for sanctions against the petitioners under sec-
tion 8.01-271.1.1" After stating that he had "never seen more of a
misuse of the judicial system" in his twenty-three years on the
bench, the trial court judge granted the supervisors' motion for
sanctions and ordered that each petitioner pay $2000.1'
On appeal "[t]he petitioners argue[d] that the nonsuit order
was a final order for purposes of Rule 1:1, and . .. thus the [trial]
court lost jurisdiction over the case [twenty-one] days after its en-
try," and so did not have the power to impose sanctions."' The pe-
titioners further argued that they were not parties to the removal
action for purposes of section 8.01-271.1.146 As to the Rule 1:1 is-
sue, the supreme court recognized that under its previous holding
in Super Fresh Food Markets of Virginia, Inc. v. Ruffin,14 "a cir-
cuit court may avoid the application of the [twenty-one] day [rule]
by including specific language [in an order to indicate that it] is
retaining jurisdiction to address matters still pending.""' The su-
preme court therefore held that the nonsuit order was not final
due to the reservation language and that the trial court had ju-
risdiction to impose sanctions.149 On the issue of sanctions, how-
139. Id. at 406-07, 707 S.E.2d at 326.




144. Id. at 407-08, 707 S.E.2d at 327.
145. Id. at 408, 707 S.E.2d at 327.
146. Id. at 410, 707 S.E.2d at 328.
147. 263 Va. 555, 561, 561 S.E.2d 734, 737 (2002).
148. Johnson, 281 Va. at 409-10, 707 S.E.2d at 328 (citing Super Fresh Farm Mkts. of
Va., Inc., 263 Va. at 561, 561 S.E.2d at 737).
149. Id.
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ever, the supreme court explained that section 8.01-271.1 "applies
only to parties and their attorneys.""'o The supreme court further
held that although the removal action was initiated by the filing
of the petition, the parties to the removal action were the Com-
monwealth and the supervisors, and the petitioners themselves
were not "parties" who were subject to sanctions.'
K. Discontinuance of Inactive Cases
In Rutter v. Oakwood Living Centers of Virginia, the supreme
court held that Virginia Code section 8.01-335(B), governing dis-
continuance of actions after more than three years of inactivity,
does not allow a trial court to dismiss or discontinue a case with a
self-executing, prospective order. 152 The case involved a plaintiff
in a wrongful death suit with several defendants."' In September
2000, two of the defendants filed for bankruptcy and notified the
circuit court of the stay of the wrongful death case against them
under federal bankruptcy law."4 In response to the notice, the cir-
cuit court entered an order on October 4, 2000, removing the ac-
tion from the court's docket "with leave . . . to place [the] action
back on the docket . .. upon resolution of the bankruptcy proceed-
ing.""' The court's order further stated that "[lt]his action shall be
ordered to be discontinued if after three years there has been no
further order or proceeding under [Code] § 8.01-335(B)."" After
some confusion as to the scope of the removal order, the plaintiff
filed a motion to set a trial date in June 2005. "' Thereafter, how-
ever, there was no activity on the docket "until April 2009, when
[one of the defendants] filed a plea of statute of limitations and/or
motion to dismiss."' The defendant argued that under the court's
October 4, 2000, order, the action abated as of October 4, 2003,
and the plaintiff had both failed to re-file within the remaining
statute of limitations and within the one year to file a motion for
150. Id. at 412, 707 S.E.2d at 329.
151. Id. at 406-07, 410-12, 707 S.E.2d at 326-29.
152. 282 Va. 4, 12, 710 S.E.2d 460, 464 (2011); see VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-335(B) (Repl.
Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2011).
153. 282 Va. at 7, 710 S.E.2d at 461.
154. Id. at 7-8, 710 S.E.2d at 461.
155. Id., 710 S.E.2d at 461-62 (citation omitted).
156. Id. at 8, 710 S.E.2d at 461-62.
157. Id., 710 S.E.2d at 462 (alteration in original).
158. Id.
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reinstatement."' The circuit court granted the motion and dis-
missed the complaint.'
On appeal, the issue presented was "whether the circuit court
erred by treating the 2000 [o]rder as a self-executing order pro-
spectively discontinuing [plaintiffs] action under Code § 8.01-
355(B)."61 According to code section 8.01-355:
Any court in which is pending a case wherein for more than three
years there has been no order or proceeding, except to continue it,
may, in its discretion, order it to be struck from its docket and the
action shall thereby be discontinued. The court may dismiss cases
under this subsection without any notice to the parties. The clerk
shall provide the parties with a copy of the final order discontinuing
or dismissing the case. Any case discontinued or dismissed under the
provisions of this subsection may be reinstated, on motion, after no-
tice to the parties in interest, if known, or their counsel of record
within one year from the date of such order but not after.162
Under this language, the supreme court held that "the [trial]
court erred [in ruling] that the [October] 2000 [o]rder served to
discontinue [the case] as of October 2003.""' As the supreme court
explained, a "trial court's determination that there has been no
order or proceeding for at least three years must be made con-
temporaneously with the entry of the order discontinuing or dis-
missing the action."16 The court also noted that section 8.01-
335(B) additionally "requires the clerk of the trial court to provide
the parties with a copy of the final order . .. dismissing the ac-
tion," and reasoned that, "in the case of a self-executing, prospec-
tive order of discontinuance, the clerk could not provide the par-
ties with 'the final order' contemplated in the statute.'6 After so
ruling, however, the court ultimately dismissed the appeal, sua
sponte, on the grounds that it lacked jurisdiction because the cir-
cuit court's order dismissing the action as to one of the defend-
ants was not a final, appealable order.16 6
159. Id.
160. Id. at 9, 710 S.E.2d at 462.
161. Id.
162. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-335(B) (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2011).
163. Rutter, 282 Va. at 10, 710 S.E.2d at 463.
164. Id. at 11, 710 S.E.2d at 463.
165. Id. (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-335(B) (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2011)).
166. Id. at 15, 710 S.E.2d at 466.
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L. Jurisdiction and Standing
The Supreme Court of Virginia also decided several recent cas-
es addressing issues of jurisdiction and standing."' In Jenkins v.
Mehra, the supreme court dismissed an appeal of a trial court's
judgment refusing to hold a party in contempt for failing to abide
by the terms of a prior court order."' In so ruling, the court noted
that no right to appeal a contempt order existed at common law
and the General Assembly had not provided appellate jurisdiction
to the supreme court or the court of appeals to review the judg-
ment of the circuit court refusing to hold the party in contempt of
court.'69 In Davis v. County of Fairfax, the supreme court ad-
dressed a multi-layered question of whether a circuit court
properly exercised jurisdiction "over a case that originated in
[the] . . . [g]eneral [d]istrict [c]ourt, was appealed to the circuit
court and non-suited there, was subsequently re-filed in the gen-
eral district court, and then appealed to the circuit court."' Ac-
cording to the supreme court, the circuit court obtained appellate
jurisdiction from the de novo appeal taken from the general dis-
trict court and the nonsuit did not divest the circuit court of that
jurisdiction."' Thus, under Virginia Code section 8.01-380, gov-
erning nonsuits, the case was required to be refiled in the circuit
court, not the general district court.'7 2 Because the general dis-
trict court did not have jurisdiction to hear the refiled case, the
circuit court did not have jurisdiction to decide the appeal be-
cause of its derivative appellate jurisdiction."' In so holding, the
supreme court expressly overruled Lewis v. Culpeper County De-
partment of Social Services, to the extent inconsistent with the
court's opinion.
167. See Davis v. Cnty. of Fairfax, 282 Va. 23, 26, 710 S.E.2d 466, 467 (2011); Va. Ma-
rine Res. Comm'n v. Clark, 281 Va. 679, 682, 709 S.E.2d 150, 152 (2011); Jenkins v.
Mehra, 281 Va. 37, 40, 704 S.E.2d 577, 579 (2011); Virginian-Pilot Media Cos. v. Dow
Jones & Co., 280 Va. 464, 466, 698 S.E.2d 900, 901 (2010).
168. 281 Va. at 40, 704 S.E.2d at 579.
169. Id. at 43, 48, 704 S.E.2d at 580, 583.
170. 282 Va. at 26, 710 S.E.2d at 467.
171. Id. at 30, 710 S.E.2d at 469.
172. Id. (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-380(A) (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2011)).
173. Id. at 30-31, 710 S.E.2d at 469.
174. Id. at 31, 710 S.E.2d at 470 (citing Lewis v. Culpeper Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 50
Va. App. 160, 168, 647 S.E.2d 511, 515 (2007), overruled in part by Davis, 282 Va. at 31,
710 S.E.2d at 470).
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In Virginian-Pilot Media Companies, L.L.C. v. Dow Jones &
Company, Inc., a case Justice Mims's concurring opinion de-
scribed as presenting a "procedural Gordian knot,""' the supreme
court addressed whether a circuit court has subject-matter juris-
diction to determine whether a newspaper meets the require-
ments under Virginia Code section 8.01-324(A) for publication of
ordinances, resolutions, notices, or advertisements required by
law and whether a rival newspaper had standing to challenge the
circuit court's jurisdiction."' On appeal, the supreme court held
that section 8.01-324(A) lacks any grant of subject-matter juris-
diction to the circuit courts,"' but found it unnecessary to address
the standing question, as a court order entered without jurisdic-
tion is a nullity."' In a lengthy dissent, Justice Lemons, joined by
Justice Kinser, criticized the majority for ignoring the issue of
standing."' According to Justice Lemons,
[t]he effect of the majority holding in this case is truly far reaching.
Pursuant to the majority holding, a person in Roanoke learning by
newspaper account of a judgment rendered by the Circuit Court of
the County of Fairfax could intervene in the appeal of the matter to
the Supreme Court of Virginia for the sole purpose of asserting lack
of subject matter jurisdiction, even though that person had no inter-
est whatsoever in the merits of the case.
In another opinion on standing, Virginia Marine Resources
Commission v. Clark, the supreme court addressed whether a pe-
tition for review from a decision of the Virginia Marine Resources
Commission ("VMRC") was deficient because it did not contain al-
legations to show the plaintiffs standing.'"' The court of appeals
ruled the petition was sufficient because Rule 2A:4(b) states that
a petition for appeal "shall designate the regulation or case deci-
sion appealed from, specify the errors assigned, state the reasons
why the regulation or case decision is deemed to be unlawful and
conclude with a specific statement of the relief requested," and
does not specifically state that the petition must contain factual
175. 280 Va. 464, 478, 698 S.E.2d 900, 908 (2010) (Mims, J., concurring).
176. Id. at 466, 698 S.E.2d at 901 (majority opinion).
177. Id. at 469, 698 S.E.2d at 902 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-324(A) (Repl. Vol. 2009
& Cum. Supp. Vol. 2011)).
178. Id. at 468-70, 698 S.E.2d at 902-03 (citations omitted).
179. Id. at 470-78, 698 S.E.2d at 903-07 (Lemons, J., dissenting).
180. Id. at 477, 698 S.E.2d at 907.
181. 281 Va. 679, 682, 709 S.E.2d 150, 152 (2011).
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allegations supporting the petitioner's standing.18 2 The supreme
court held that nothing in Rule 2A:4 excused the petitioner from
establishing his standing by setting forth allegations to show that
he was a person "aggrieved" by the VMRC for purposes of contest-
ing its decision."' Thus, even though the petition satisfied the
four elements of Rule 2A:4, the supreme court held that it was
properly dismissed by the circuit court for failure to allege the ba-
sis for the petitioner's standing.18 4
III. AMENDMENTS TO RULES OF COURT
A. Amendments
Through an order dated March 1, 2011, effective May 2, 2011,
the Supreme Court of Virginia amended Rule 1:8 to provide that,
"[u]nless otherwise [ordered] in a particular case, any written mo-
tion for leave to file an amended pleading shall be accompanied
by a properly executed proposed amended pleading, in a form
suitable for filing.""' The rule further provides that "[i]f the mo-
tion [to amend] is granted, the [proposed] amended pleading ...
[is] deemed filed . . . as of the date of the court's order permit-
ting such amendment."8 In the event that the motion is granted
in part, the rule provides that "the court may provide for filing an
amended pleading as the court .. . deem[s] reasonable and prop-
er.". The rule also provides that if amendment "is granted [by
means] other than [through] written motion, . . . the amended
pleading [must] be filed within [twenty-one] days after leave ...
is granted or [within] such time as the court may prescribe."88
The supreme court's March 1, 2011 order also amends Rule 3:16,
which addresses the addition of new parties through amended
182. Id. at 684-85, 709 S.E.2d at 153 (quoting VA. Sup. CT. R. pt. 2A, R. 2A:4(b) (Repl.
Vol. 2011)).
183. Id. at 685, 709 S.E.2d at 154.
184. Id. at 683-85, 709 S.E.2d at 153-54.
185. Order Amending Rule 1:8, Rules of Supreme Court of Virginia (Mar. 1, 2011) (ef-
fective May 2, 2011), available at http://courts.state.va.us/courts/scv/amendmentstrack
ed/2011_0502_rule_1_08_amend.pdf.
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pleadings, to address the requirement of attaching a properly ex-
ecuted proposed amended complaint.'
B. Electronic Filing and Service
By order dated March 1, 2011, and effective May 2, 2011, the
Supreme Court of Virginia substantially edited Rule 1:17 regard-
ing electronic filing and service.' The order also amended several
other rules to contemplate cases with electronic filings under
Rule 1:17.'9'
C. Appellate Practice
In 2010, the Supreme Court of Virginia adopted a wholesale
reenactment of Part Five and Part Five A, which govern practice
before the Supreme Court of Virginia and Court of Appeals of
Virginia.'9 2 Through its order dated March 1, 2011, effective May
2, 2011, the supreme court adopted further amendments to both
parts.'93 The most significant amendments were to clarify in a
number of rules that the length of petitions and briefs is the long-
er of either the page or word count limit.'9 4 In addition, Rule 5:5,
regarding filing deadlines, was amended to provide that the dead-
line for filing a petition for the review of a temporary injunction
under Virginia Code section 8.01-626 and Rule 5:17A, is manda-
tory.' Rule 5:7, regarding petitions for writs of habeas corpus,
was also amended to provide that, "[i]f the statute of limitations
has not expired, a petitioner may move . . . at any time before a
ruling is rendered on the merits of the petition. . . for leave . . . to
189. Id.; Order Amending Rule 3:16, Rules of Supreme Court of Virginia (Mar. 1, 2011)
(effective May 2, 2011), available at http://courts.state.va.us/courts/scv/amendments-track
ed/2011_0502_rulej1_08_amend.pdf.
190. Order Amending Rule 1:17, Rules of Supreme Court of Virginia, at 5-12 (Mar. 1,
2011) (effective May 2, 2011), available at http://courts.state.va.us/courts/scv/amendmen
ts/20110301efiling-part_l4_seven_8.pdf.
191. Id. at 1-4.
192. Order Amending Part Five and Part Five A, Rules of Supreme Court of Virginia
(Apr. 30, 2011) (effective July 1, 2010), available at http://courts.state.va.us/courts/scv/
amendments/2010 0430_part five and-partfive-a.pdf; see also John R. Walk & Andrew
P. Sherrod, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Civil Practice and Procedure, 45 U. RICH. L.
REV. 183, 211-12 (2010) (discussing appellate rules amendments).
193. Order Amending Part Five and Part Five A, Rules of Supreme Court of Virginia
(Mar. 2, 2011) (effective May 2, 2011).
194. Id. at 2.
195. Id. at 1.
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substitute an amended petition.""' The rule now also provides
that the amended petition can include additional claims not pre-
sented in the initial petition."' The rule requires that "any such
motion [for amendment must] attach a copy of the proposed
amended petition."198 The order also modifies Rule 5A:35 to pro-
vide specific requirements for rehearings."
IV. NEW LEGISLATION
A. Jurisdictional Limit for General District Court
In a move that will likely promote cost-efficiency in trying
modest disputes, the 2011 General Assembly increased the juris-
dictional limit for cases brought in general district courts from
$15,000 to $25,000.200 The General Assembly also expanded the
reach of the exception to the jurisdictional limit for claims, coun-
terclaims, and cross claims for damages in unlawful detainer ac-
tions by eliminating a provision that limited the exception to
claims "where the premises were used by the occupant primarily
for business, commercial or agricultural purposes."201
B. Statute of Limitations for Sexual Abuse Claims
Through chapter 617 of the 2011 Acts of Assembly, the General
Assembly lengthened the statute of limitations for "action[s] for
injury to the person . . . resulting from sexual abuse occurring
during infancy or incapacity . .. [to twenty] years after the cause
of action accrues." 202 The limitations period had previously been
two years from time of accrual under the general provisions of
Virginia Code section 8.01-243.203
196. Id. at 3.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 17.
200. Act of March 26, 2011, ch. 702, 2011 Va. Acts (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of VA. CODE ANN. (Cum. Supp. 2011)).
201. Act of March 14, 2011, ch. 76, 2011 Va. Acts- (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 16.1-77(3) (Supp. 2011)).
202. Act of March 26, 2011, ch. 617, 2011 Va. Acts - (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§ 8.01-243 (Cum. Supp. 2011).
203. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-243(A) (Repl. Vol. 2007).
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C. Medical Malpractice Damages Cap
Section 8.01-581.15 of the Virginia Code sets forth limitations
on the total amount recoverable for certain medical malpractice
actions.20 ' Previously, the statute established annual increases
through July 1, 2008.205 In its 2011 session, the General Assembly
amended section 8.01-581.15 to establish additional periodic in-
creases to the medical malpractice damages cap beginning July 1,
2012.206 Thereafter, the cap increases annually in the amount of
$50,000 through July 1, 2031, when the cap reaches $3 million.2 07
The Act provides that "[e]ach annual increase shall apply to the
act or acts of malpractice occurring on or after the effective date
of the increase."20 8
D. Sovereign Immunity under Fraud Against Taxpayers Act
In the 2010 case of Ligon v. County of Goochland, the Supreme
Court of Virginia held that the doctrine of sovereign immunity
barred a claim against a county under the Virginia Fraud Against
Taxpayers Act ("VFATA"). 20 9 In so ruling, the supreme court
pointed out that nothing in the VFATA "specifically states that
employees of the Commonwealth and its political subdivisions
may sue their employers for retaliatory discharge under the stat-
ute."2 10 In response to Ligon, during the 2011 session, the General
Assembly amended VFATA to provide an express waiver of sover-
eign immunity and to make clear that the law "creates a cause of
action by an employee against the Commonwealth if the Com-
monwealth is the employer responsible for the adverse employ-
ment action that would entitle the employee to . . . relief."2 1' The
204. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.15 (Cum. Supp. 2011).
205. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.15 (Repl. Vol. 2007).
206. Act of April 6, 2011, ch. 758, 2011 Va. Acts_ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-581.15 (Cum. Supp. 2011)).
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. 279 Va. 312, 319, 689 S.E.2d 666, 670 (2010). See generally Walk & Sherrod, supra
note 192, at 207-08 (discussing Ligon case).
210. Ligon, 279 Va. at 319, 689 S.E.2d at 670.
211. Act of Mar. 26, 2011, ch. 651, 2011 Va. Acts (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-216.8) (Cum. Supp. 2011)). The General Assembly also made substantive
changes to FATA. See Act of Mar. 26, 2011, ch. 676, 2011 Va. Acts - (codified as amend-
ed at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-216.2, -216.3, -216.8, -216.9, -216.17; codified at id. § 8.01-
216.10 (Cum. Supp. 2011)).
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Act also provides that any such damages would "be reduced by
any amount awarded to the employee through a state or local
. ,,212grievance process.
E. Bond Requirement for Appeals from General District Court
Chapter 58 of the 2011 Acts of Assembly modifies section 16.1-
107 of the Virginia Code, addressing requirements for appeals
from general district courts. 2 13 The Act provides that an appeal
bond is not required for "a defendant [who has] indemnity cover-
age through a . . . liability insurance [policy] sufficient to satisfy
the judgment."21 4 The insurance company must, however, "pro-
vide[] a written irrevocable confirmation of coverage in
the amount of the judgment."2 15 If the insurer does not provide
such a letter, an appeal bond is required.2 16
F. Privileged Health Care Communications
Through chapter 15 of the 2011 Acts of Assembly, the legisla-
ture clarified the scope of privilege and protection from discovery
afforded to information provided in the peer review process.' The
Act provides that "factual information regarding specific patient
health care or treatment, including patient health care incidents,"
is not privileged.2 18 "Information known by a witness with
knowledge of the [underlying] facts . . . [can therefore] be discov-
ered by deposition or otherwise."2 19 In contrast, "the analysis, find-
ings, conclusions, recommendations, and the deliberative process
of any medical staff committee, utilization review committee, or
other committee, board, group, commission, or other [specified]
entit[ies]" are privileged and subject to protection from discov-
ery.220 The proceedings, minutes, records, and reports (including
212. Act of Mar. 26, 2011, ch. 651, 2011 Va. Acts (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-216.8 (Cum Supp. 2011)).
213. See Act of Mar. 14, 2011, ch. 58, 2011 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA.




217. Act of Feb. 25, 2011, ch. 15, 2011 Va. Acts (codified as amended at VA. CODE
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those of experts) of such bodies are also protected, and "[a] person
involved in the work of [such bodies is] not . .. made a witness
with knowledge of the [underlying] facts [merely] by virtue of
[participation] in the quality assurance, peer review, or creden-
,,221tialing process.
G. Objections to Jurisdiction and Defective Process-Waiver
Chapter 710 of the 2011 Acts of Assembly enacts a new statute
to provide explicit and welcome guidance to practitioners regard-
ing what types of affirmative conduct will constitute a waiver of
objections to personal jurisdiction or deficient service of process.222
Objections to personal jurisdiction and defective process are
waived if a party "engages in conduct related to adjudicating the
merits of the case."22 3 Examples of such conduct include "[f]iling a
demurrer, plea ... bar, answer, counterclaim, cross-claim, or
third-party claim; [c]onducting discovery," unless authorized by
the court to adjudicate the objection to jurisdiction or process;
"[s]eeking a ruling on the merits ... ; or [a]ctively participating in
proceedings related to [a] determin[ation of] the merits of the
case."24 Conversely, the Act specifies that
[a] person does not waive . . . objection[s] to personal jurisdiction or
defective process . . . [by] engag[ing] in conduct unrelated to adjudi-
cating the merits . . . , [such as r]equesting or agreeing to an exten-
sion of time; [a]greeing to a scheduling order; [c]onducting [author-
ized] discovery . .. related to . . . the objection; . . . [fliling a motion to
transfer venue [along with the objection to jurisdiction or process], or
221[r]emoving the case to federal court.
H. Circuit Court Fees
Virginia Code section 17.1-275 sets forth various fees collected
by clerks of the circuit courts. 2 6 Through chapter 707 of the 2011
Acts of Assembly, the legislature exempted "counterclaims
[and] other responsive pleading[s] in any annulment, divorce, or
221. Id.
222. Act of Mar. 26, 2011, ch. 710, 2011 Va. Acts _(codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-




226. VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-275 (Supp. 2011).
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separate maintenance proceeding" from being charged a filing fee
by the clerk.2 27
I. Judicial Notice of Certain Tax-Related Documents
Chapter 800 of the 2011 Acts of Assembly provides that a tri-
bunal may take judicial notice of certain tax rulings, bulletins,
guidelines, and other specified publications in proceedings relat-
ing to the interpretation or enforcement of the Virginia tax
laws.228
J. Civil Immunity for Non-Profit Officers
Chapter 693 of the 2011 Acts of Assembly makes clear that the
civil immunity for certain directors, partners, members, manag-
ers, trustees, and officers of certain non-profits provided under
current law "survive[s] any termination, cancellation, or other
discontinuance of the organization."22 9
K. Presumption for Certain Workers' Compensation Cases
Chapter 304 of the 2011 Acts of Assembly adds a provision to
the Workers' Compensation Act that creates a presumption in
certain cases that the injury at issue was work-related.2 3 0 In order
for the presumption to apply, the employee must be "physically or
mentally unable to testify as confirmed by competent medical ev-
idence," and there must be "unrebutted prima facie evidence that
indicates ... the injury was work related."231 The presumption can
be overcome by a preponderance of the evidence.2 32
227. Act of Mar. 26, 2011, ch. 707, 2011 Va. Acts (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 17.1-275) (Supp. 2011)).
228. Act of Apr. 6, 2011, ch. 800, 2011 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 58.1-204, -205) (Cum. Supp. 2011)).
229. Act of Mar. 26, 2011, ch. 693, 2011 Va. Acts (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 13.1-8701; codified at id. §§ 8.01-220.1:1, 13.1-870.1, -870.2) (Cum. Supp. 2011)).
230. Act of Mar. 20, 2011, ch. 304, 2011 Va. Acts - (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-
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L. Retired Judges Allowed to Perform Certain Pro Bono Work
Through chapter 705 of the 2011 Acts of Assembly, the legisla-
ture allowed retired judges to appear as counsel in pro bono mat-
ters under certain specified circumstances.2 3
M. Defined Terms in Evidence
Chapter 81 of the 2011 Acts of Assembly adds "official publica-
tion," "publish," and "required to be published pursuant to the
laws thereof' as defined terms used in the Virginia Code Chapter
on Evidence.
233. Act of Mar. 26, 2011, ch. 705, 2011 Va. Acts (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 51.9-
309) (Cum. Supp. 2011)).
234. Act of Mar. 14, 2011, ch. 81, 2011 Va. Acts - (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-
385) (Cum. Supp. 2011)).
2011] 39
$8
